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..................................... 
The jewel in the East Asian "economic miracle" of the 1980s and 1990s 
came crashing to earth during late 1997 with a collapse of the currency and 
disintegration of the banking system. By mid-1998 Suharto was forced out 
of office by a tidal wave of street protests, and raging fires were ablaze 
throughout the land. In this paper we draw attention to the fundamentals of 
the finance crisis and the environmental crisis as they relate to the state of 
tropical rainforests in Indonesia. It is concluded that, somewhat ironically, 
the dramatic collapse of the Indonesian economy and the devastating forest 
fires of the late 1990s may lead to the preservation of one of the earth's 
most significant heritage sites, the tropical rainforests and biodiversity of 
Indonesia.  
Although Indonesia occupies only 1.3% of the world's land area, the country 
possesses about 10% of the world's flowering plant species, 12% of all 
mammal species, 17% of all reptile and amphibian species, and 17% of all 
bird species (National Development Planning Agency, 1993). The great 
lowland forests in much of Kalimantan and Sumatra are gone for good, and 
countless species have been driven to extinction in the process. However, 
there remains much to preserve, protect, and utilise sustainably.  
In 1997/98 an economic crisis, raging fires, and political tensions ignited 
simultaneously across Indonesia. The jewel in the East Asian "economic 
miracle" of the 1980s and 1990s came crashing to earth during late 1997. 
The government of President Suharto, borne as a result of one of the most 
bloody CIA-sponsored coups in history, had a dramatic reversal of fortune, 
the most significant reversal during the recent history of capitalist hegemony 
(World Bank, 1998).  
President Suharto resigned on May 21, 1998. He had originally come to 
power in 1965, with assistance from the Central Intelligence Agency, as the 
Army Chief-of-Staff, overthrowing the first president of independent 
Indonesia, Achmad Sukarno. In 1966 Suharto assumed the major civilian 
cabinet positions himself.  He became acting president in 1967 and the 
Supreme Commander of the Army and president in 1968. The Army coup in 
1965, under his leadership, initiated a wave of terror based on the slaughter 
of 600,000 people, the imprisonment of 1.5 million, and mass violations of 
human rights, especially of those people alleged to be communist. Suharto 
then proceeded to entice foreign investment by ensuring that labour 
conditions were harsh and pay rates were minimal, trade unions were 
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decimated, and environmental restrictions were removed. His dictatorship 
was never absolute, given the complexity of the nation. He was forced to 
continually juggle the competing demands of the defence forces (ABRI), the 
economic technocrats insisting on privatisation and deregulation, the 
economic nationalists and their worries about foreign control of the 
economy, and religious groups (particularly Islamic ones) who agonised 
about the collapse of traditional value systems. Through the 1990s, the 
Suharto regime looked increasingly out of place in Southeast Asia as many 
of the surrounding countries, notably the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Thailand, shed authoritarian regimes and moved towards democratic 
principles, Indonesians are presently in the agonizing and perilous process of 
trying to put their nation back together.  
When Suharto was finally forced out of office by a tidal wave of street 
protests, raging fires were ablaze throughout the land and the tropical forest 
heritage of humankind continued to be ravaged by corporate arsonists and 
profit seekers. Strikes and protests over the price of food and basic 
necessities have become increasingly common throughout the country. The 
legitimacy of ABRI, long a powerful political player, is now at an all-time low. 
With each new discovery of atrocities in East and West Timor, it sinks lower. 
However, Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic conflict is on the rise.  
In this paper I sketch the fundamentals of the finance crisis, the 
environmental crisis, and the state of tropical rainforests in Indonesia. I 
argue that, somewhat ironically, the dramatic collapse of the Indonesian 
economy and the devastating forest fires of the late 1990s may, albeit 
optimistically, lead to the preservation of one of the earth's most significant 
heritage sites, the tropical rainforests and biodiversity of Indonesia.  The 
first section provides background information. The subsequent three sections 
pursue the crucial issues that are identified by their titles: finances, fires, 
and forests. In the penultimate section I offer an optimistic vision of the 
necessary struggle ahead and I conclude with observations of future trends 
and changes.  
Background  
Historical  
Parts of the Indonesian archipelago were inhabited as early as half a million 
years ago and forms of shifting cultivation would have been practised from 
very early times. Most of the archipelago was originally forested. In these 
forests trees grow to more than 60 metres with their branches forming a 
canopy that decreases the intensity of rain and provides shade, which 
reduces ground temperatures. This in turn reduces leaching of the soil and 
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helps preserve the soil structure. A gradual shift to sedentary forms of 
agriculture would have developed in river valleys that had soils fertile 
enough to support it (Hardjono, 1971, pp. 119-120). Many pre-colonial 
maritime states of Southeast Asia, founded and maintained by trade, rose 
and fell according to their ability to control access to the bounty of the 
forests in their agricultural hinterlands (Wolters, 1967).  
During more recent colonial history, from the 17th to the 20th century, the 
forests and forest people of Indonesia have served Dutch traders and 
officials, Chinese businessmen, Javanese kings and regents, Japanese war 
planners, and Indonesian foresters.  According to Peluso (1988) "the 19th 
century is a turning point in the study of forest use, management, and 
control.  It was then that a state-managed agency drew boundaries between 
forest and agricultural land and established police forces to restrict people's 
access to trees" (p. 41).  Ownership, usufruct rights, and tenure were often 
location specific and recognised as such, dependent upon power relations 
between the State, forestry officials, corporate loggers, and forest 
inhabitants (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], 1990a, p. 3).  
During the second half of the 20th century the Indonesian forest area as a 
percentage of the landmass decreased from 74% to 56% (FAO, 1990b, p. 
2). The pattern of forest policy in Indonesia was marked by a sudden shift 
from one policy to another in three identifiable stages. The first shift, 
occurring in 1966 to 1967, proceeded from the change from harvesting 
timber mainly from teak plantations in Java (operated by the state-owned 
company) to harvesting large areas of primary forests by several hundred 
private logging companies. The second shift occurred between 1979 and 
1985 and involved trade policy.  It was a move from exporting raw logs to 
exporting processed wood. The third shift, occurring from 1989 to the 
present, shows a change from relying on natural forest areas for timber 
production and selective cutting, to relying more on timber plantations with 
fast growing species and clear cutting. Responsibility for managing and 
regenerating natural forests was largely relinquished to concessionaires, with 
the Ministry of Forestry playing a monitoring and supervisory role. (FAO, 
1990a, p. 2; Hafild, 1994, p. 15). During this time logging and related 
industries contributed an average of 20% of Indonesia's total foreign 
exchange revenues and generated personal and corporate wealth for those 
involved in forest industries.  
It was not until the New Order government of Suharto, at the instigation of 
the World Bank, that there occurred the systematic and rapid exploitation of 
the forests to finance the increasing foreign debt and to tackle the 85% 
inflation rate. The ideology underpinning the New Order emphasised political 
stability and economic development in contrast to political uncertainty and 
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economic stagnation. This included the banning of all communist and leftist 
organizations, worker organizations (except for "company unions"), and the 
Indonesian Peasant Front; and the assertion of military control over all 
political life. In economic terms, macroeconomic stability, foreign 
investment, and trade were at the forefront (Manning, 1999, p. 43). 
Economic growth and expansion were defined in very simple and traditional 
ways. Growth in gross domestic product, growth in foreign investment, and 
growth in urban physical infrastructure were deemed measures of success. 
Even the most basic argument, such as suggesting that the economic capital 
value of rainforests should be deducted from the gross domestic product as 
they were depleted, was seen as leftist propaganda initiated by opponents of 
the regime. Therefore, in a most unsubtle fashion, with full concurrence of 
the World Bank, the tropical rainforests were identified as an expendable 
resource providing the wherewithal to pay off internal and external debt, 
promote foreign investment, and expand exports.  
Immediately following the solidification of power by the Indonesian generals 
under the guidance of President Suharto many Japanese and American firms 
acquired logging concessions, notably in heavily forested Kalimantan 
(Dauvergne, 1993/94). From 1969 to 1974 foreign earnings from timber 
rose 2800% and throughout the 1970s the Five-Year Plans continually relied 
on foreign revenue from unprocessed log exports to finance development.  
Head (1991) drew a direct connection between debt and deforestation right 
up to the late 1980s:  
Indonesia's debt can be directly linked to deforestation. The 
current Indonesian requirement for foreign exchange to service 
the debt to Japan is some USD 2 billion per year.  The value of 
Indonesian forest product export is approximately the same. . . . 
On the further premise that forest depletion to the extent now 
under way in Indonesia has a worldwide negative effect on the 
environment, the climate of societies in many regions is being 
sacrificed in the interests of the Japanese banking community. 
(pp. 104-105) 
   
At the same time, from the 1980s to the very recent past, crony capitalists 
pocketed massive economic rents, irrespective of monitoring by the Ministry 
of Forestry (World Bank, 1995c, annex 3)  
General 
Indonesia is a huge archipelagic country extending 5,120 kilometres from 
east to west and 1,760 kilometres from north to south. It encompasses 
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13,667 islands (some sources say as many as 18,000), only 6,000 of which 
are inhabited. There are five main islands (Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, 
Sulawesi, and Irian Jaya), two major archipelagos (Nusa Tenggara and the 
Maluku Islands), and sixty smaller archipelagos. Two of the islands are 
shared with other nations; Kalimantan (known in the colonial period as 
Borneo, the world's third largest island) is shared with Malaysia and Brunei, 
and Irian Jaya shares the island of New Guinea with Papua New Guinea. 
Indonesia's total land area is 1,919,317 square kilometres. Included in 
Indonesia's total territory is another 93,000 square kilometres of inland seas 
(straits, bays, and other bodies of water). The additional surrounding sea 
areas bring Indonesia's generally recognised territory (land and sea) to 
about 5 million square kilometres. The government, however, also claims an 
exclusive economic zone, which brings the total to about 7.9 million square 
kilometres.  
Sumatra, Java (and Madura), Kalimantan (formerly Borneo), and Sulawesi 
(formerly Celebes) make up the Greater Sunda Islands. These islands, 
except for Sulawesi, lie on the Sunda Shelf, an extension of the Malay 
Peninsula. Far to the east is Irian Jaya (formerly Irian Barat or West New 
Guinea), which takes up the western half of the world's second largest 
island, New Guinea, on the Sahul Shelf. Sea depths in the Sunda and Sahul 
shelves average 200 metres or less. Between these two shelves lie Sulawesi, 
Nusa Tenggara (also known as the Lesser Sunda Islands), and the Maluku 
Islands (or the Moluccas), which form a second island group where the 
surrounding seas in some places reach 4,500 metres in depth. Various 
writers use the term Outer Islands inconsistently but it is usually taken to 
mean those islands other than Java and Madura.  
The estimated population as of July 1999 was 207 million, growing at a rate 
of 1.6% annually. Recently life expectancy has dramatically improved and 
stands at 65.4 years. The main variable of Indonesia's climate is not 
temperature or air pressure but rainfall. The almost uniformly warm waters 
that make up 81% of Indonesia's area ensure that temperatures on land 
remain fairly constant. Split by the equator, the archipelago is almost 
entirely tropical in climate with the coastal plains averaging 28° Celsius, the 
inland and mountain areas averaging 26° Celsius, and the higher mountain 
regions, 23° Celsius.  
The traditional markets of earlier times are giving way in the major towns to 
proliferating shopping malls with a vast array of merchandise. While the poor 
have become better off, wealth is now displayed ostentatiously at the very 
top income levels. Private capital has been accumulated as never before and 
vast private commercial conglomerates have emerged, many owned by 
Sino-Indonesians, all possessing high-level political connections. The 
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international connections of these enterprises have undoubtedly tipped the 
balance of power between the State apparatus and these private actors in 
favour of the latter. Whereas they had been crucially dependent on State 
largesse and patronage for commercial success in the 1970s, by the late 
1980s the private sector had achieved very considerable autonomy. The 
most remarkable transformation has occurred in the timber industry where 
concessions have conferred immense fortunes on a favoured few (Hill, 1994, 
pp. xxv-xxvi). Since the crisis of 1997 the State is re-asserting its authority 
but instability and unpredictability remain dominant.   
The timber industry was given added importance with the rapid downturn in 
textile exports, a major economic indicator of Indonesia's well being in the 
past, during the 1990s. Many small- and medium-scale textile plants in 
Majalaya of West Java and Pekalongan of Central Java have had to shut 
down in the last couple of years. Increasing raw material prices for cotton, 
rayon, and polyester is blamed, and pessimists describe this as the 
beginning of the end for raw textiles. The industry provides a large number 
of jobs, particularly in the small- and medium-scale firms. Majalaya and 
Pekalongan have been the centre for small-scale textile industries for more 
than 20 years. In 1995 Pekalongan had 9,000 firms employing 110,000 
workers and Majalaya had 700 companies with a workforce of 12,278 
(Indonesia Business Weekly, 1995, pp. 4-8).  
Finances  
Indonesia was a major player when the Asian economic "miracle" stalled, 
leaving the nation and several of its neighbours looking to the International 
Monetary Fund for multi-billion-dollar bailouts. By January 1998 the value of 
the rupiah had plunged over 70%. Food riots, ethnic violence, and protests 
against the government mounted. International attention to the country's 
crisis has focused on the web of bad lending practices by banks, over-
borrowing by companies, an economic boom driven largely by overpriced 
real estate, artificially maintained exchange rates, and speculation. But as 
most of those who had any knowledge of Indonesia whatsoever knew, the 
underlying truth is that the country has been in trouble for decades. While 
the country was dazzling investors with 8 to 10% annual growth rates, 
Suharto's "New Order," as his 32-year reign was called, had been raiding the 
country's treasure house of natural wealth and cheap human labour. This 
was accomplished by maintaining a veneer of impressive exports and returns 
on investment and by liquidating the country's natural capital. In order to 
keep up appearances, dissent was immediately suppressed (Runyan, 1998).  
It quickly became evident that the Indonesian economy had been more 
severely battered by the crisis than any other in the Asian region, and was in 
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monetary free fall. The rupiah, which was trading at around 2,500 to the US 
dollar in June 1997, had fallen to around 14,850 to the dollar by June 1998 
(Booth, 2000, p. 23). At the end of 2000 the rupiah was hovering at around 
8,000 to the dollar, partially assisted by an end of year downturn in the 
United States' economy.  
During the past decade, real annual growth in gross domestic product grew 
rapidly until 1995 when it reached USD 202 billion. Growth then fell away for 
the rest of the decade. In 1995 the economy grew by an estimated 8.2%. 
But between 1995 and 1998 the nation had a negative growth rate of GDP of 
-13.2%, with USD 94.2 billion the calculation of GDP in 1998 (World Bank, 
2000d, p. 13). In 1999, the GDP was measured as USD 141 billion as the 
exchange rate recovered.1 Both unemployment and underemployment 
increased dramatically in the second half of the decade. National product per 
capita in 2000 has begun to rise, assisted by national and international 
agencies (World Bank, 2000a). The long-term goal of the government has 
always been to raise growth to 6% in order to rapidly absorb the increasing 
labour force (Bird, 1996, p. 3; United States Central Intelligence Agency, 
1994; World Bank, 1994, p. x).  
Table 1.  Comparative GDP per capita (USD) 
Year Indonesia Malaysia PNG Philippines Solomon 
Is. 
1975 220 890 570 370 320 
1980 490 1800 810 690 440 
1985 520 1910 720 520 510 
1990 570 2400 880 750 730 
1993 740 3140 1130 850 740 
1999 681 3286 766 980 750 
(Source: World Bank, 1995a, Table 1; World Bank, 2000a; World Bank, 
2000b)  
The macroeconomic situation remains very sensitive because of the nation's 
large external debt. The debt, which was USD 104.4 billion in 1995, rose to 
USD 147.4 billion in 1999, or two-and-a-half times what it was at the start 
of the decade (Country report. Indonesia, 1996, p. 3; World Bank, 2000a). 
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The current account has been pulled back into some semblance of order 
from the disastrous figures recorded in the mid-1990s, which, as indicated 
above, was largely due to the depreciating rupiah and weak domestic 
demand (Bird, 1996, p. 10). Yet, inflation remains very high, reaching 50% 
and then falling back to 25% in 1998-1999, and gross domestic savings has 
fallen by one third. The ties to the Japanese economy through this debt are 
also substantial with 50% of the original debt denominated in Yen, or linked 
to the Yen, in multiple currency loans (World Bank, 1995b, p. 26). 
Weaknesses in oil prices, declining textile exports, and growth in wood 
product output largely due to increased prices, means that the government 
is caught in the continuing conundrum of needing to increase growth without 
increasing debt (Booth, 1992).  
Table 2.  Indonesia's External Debt (millions USD) 




11,507 20,994 36,709 66,852 147,435 
Long-term 10,372 18,169 30,660 55,717 126,494 
Short-term 1,135 2,775 6,049 11,135 20,941 
Private 
sector 
2,369 3,142 3,836 10,260 64,007 
(Source: World Bank, 1995a, p. 358; World Bank, 2000b)  
Given the heavy commitment of the World Bank and other international 
agencies to keep Indonesia economically afloat, recent reports provide an 
optimistic spin on the future. The macroeconomic indicators remain stable. 
On 23 August 2000 the President issued a decree that delegates key 
functions of the Office of the President to the Vice President, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri. The newly appointed Coordinating Minister for Economy, Dr. 
Rizal Ramli (who had been a major public critic of the old regime) launched a 
10-point "Economic Recovery Acceleration Plan" on 4 September (World 
Bank, 2000d, p. 1). Gross domestic product appears back on track with a 
4.1% increase over the year to July 2000, compared to the 13% decline in 
1998 and no growth in 1999. However, given the massive nominal debt, 
interest payments took almost 6% of the GDP in 2000. It is also recognised 
that a "30% output gap will take up to seven years before GDP per capita 
will return to its pre-crisis level" (World Bank, 2000c, p. 1). It is expected 
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that modest growth of 4-5% will continue in 2001.  
According to the World Bank, bank and corporate restructuring has begun to 
show progress (World Bank, 2000c, pp. 9, 16). Since the start of the crisis 
no less than 68 out of 237 banks were closed, and another 12 banks 
nationalised. And while corporate Indonesia is still deeply in debt (72% of 
which is denominated in foreign currencies), restructuring has started to 
take off. Yet, it was reported in November 2000, that five of the eight 
directors of the Central Bank had resigned, following months of political 
wrangling. The governor Sjahril Sabirin was under house arrest on 
corruption charges and the legislature wouldn't let President Wahid dismiss 
him. The resignations of the directors came after a dispute over who should 
shoulder responsibility for a failed multi-billion dollar bailout of the nation's 
insolvent commercial banking sector in the late 1990s. Bank Indonesia lent 
about USD 30 billion to dozens of insolvent banks during the final months of 
the dictatorship of Suharto in 1997 and the term of his successor, Habibie, in 
1998 and 1999. A government auditor has found that much of the money 
was misused and cannot be repaid.  
Although the crisis improved Indonesia's income distribution, because high-
income earners were hit harder than low-income earners, the number of 
Indonesians below the poverty line also increased dramatically, specifying 
the relativity of the changes. Three-quarters of the nation's poor live in rural 
areas where the majority of heads of household possess less than a primary 
school education (World Bank, 2000d, p. 11). The daily realities of life faced 
by many Indonesians continue to present a wide range of deprivations. 
These include inadequate shelter, health, nutrition and education; lack of 
access to safe water; inadequate means of mobility; extreme vulnerability to 
ill health; economic dislocation; natural disasters; and powerlessness to 
influence key decisions affecting their lives (World Bank, 2000c, p. 30). This 
is not to suggest that major gains haven't been made, and to be fair, 
although it was a political disgrace over most of the past three decades, the 
Suharto regime, before everything unravelled in 1998, provided for major 
economic and social gains.  
In April 1999 the outgoing parliament passed a law that gives provinces a 
greater share of the revenues generated from resource wealth produced 
locally. But devolving revenues and decision-making to provincial and local 
authorities is no guarantee that corruption will be eliminated or that the 
funds will be used more efficiently in sectors such as health and education 
(Booth, 2000, p. 35).  
Table 3.  SOCIAL INDICATORS 
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   1990 1999 
Population 179.5 206.5 
Population growth rate 2.0 1.6 
Urban population % of 
total 
30.9 39.4 
Adult literacy rate 81.5 88.4 
Life expectancy rate 62.5 65.5 
Mortality rate of children 
< 5 year old /thousand 
86.4 59.6 






% of population below 
poverty line 
   48.4 
(Source: World Bank, 2000c, p. 43) 
Fires  
Over the past three decades the El Niño Southern Oscillation phenomenon 
has occurred in 1972, 1976, 1982/83, 1987, 1991, 1994, and 1997/98. The 
El Niño events of the last decade, 1991, 1994 and 1997/98, were among the 
strongest ever recorded, setting the stage for a very dry land mass with high 
fire potential throughout Indonesia. El Niño provided the inter-relationship 
between an area of abnormally warm water in the Pacific Ocean off the coast 
of Peru and fires in Indonesia and Southeast Australia, floods in the Horn of 
Africa, storms in Europe, and abnormally mild winters in North America.  
By the end of 1997 people throughout Southeast Asia and in many nations 
around the world were expressing grave concern at the extent and severity 
of the fires in forested areas of Sumatra and Kalimantan. These concerns 
escalated as the fires increased in early 1998 following an abnormally short 
wet season. The Government of Indonesia (GOI) estimated that 170,000 
hectares of forest was burnt. Other more reliable estimates raise this 
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number by a factor of 10 (Byron & Shepherd, 1998). The point at issue is 
that the phenomenon is hardly new or unexpected. A hot, dry summer 
across Southeast Asia had been confidently predicted in 1996 based on the 
knowledge of historical patterns gained over the past 400 years (Brookfield, 
Potter, & Byron, 1995). The United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) (Climate Prediction Center ENSO Diagnostic Advisory 
Update, 1997) declared in October 1997 that all their forecasting models 
were independently predicting with statistical confidence an El Niño of record 
strength. Yet very few precautions were taken by the GOI before or during 
the drought.  
When the fires broke out once again in July-September 1999 in parts of 
Sumatra and Kalimantan, they raised fears that, given another prolonged 
dry season, a repeat of the 1997-98 disaster would undoubtedly occur.  
Given preliminary evidence that most of the fires were set intentionally by 
timber and agribusiness firms intent on clearing land as cheaply as possible, 
and the government's weak response, vast areas of forested land would be 
lost forever and millions of indigenous people would face terrible hardships.  
As it turns out, detailed surveys carried out in the 1980s by the German 
Agency for Technical Cooperation pointed out that: "it was not the drought 
which caused this huge fire, it was the changed condition of the forest . . . it 
is obvious that logging shortly before the fire had the most influence on the 
degree of damage" (Schindler, Thomas, & Panzer, 1989, p. 113). Logging 
transformed the fire-resistant primary rainforest into a degraded and fire-
prone ecosystem. Further, a satellite mapping effort, carried out with 
support from the World Bank during 1999, concluded that the average 
annual deforestation rate since 1986 has been about 1.5 million hectares, 
much of it "caused by forest fires, often ignited by people clearing land 
cheaply for plantations" (Barber & Schweithelm, 2000, p. 2).  
The conclusion is that while El Niño made it more likely that both the 
quantity and severity of the fires would increase, those factors, which 
created the "disaster," were human constructed (Byron & Shepherd, 1998). 
They include:  
         the massive amount of logging that pre-disposes the forests to burn 
because of the debris left behind, openings in the canopy, and reduced 
forest density;  
         the GOI policy of transmigration, in which people are sent from the 
populated islands to forested areas such as Sumatra and Kalimantan. 
These migrants set fires carelessly to clear additional land when their 
GOI-allotted land area proves too small or too infertile to support the 
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household;  
         the GOI's plan for the establishment of 700,000 hectares per year of 
additional oil palm plantations and for very substantial new areas of other 
tree crops-all the land of which would be cleared by fire; and  
         the conflicts created by the imposition of these newer kinds of land use 
on the original population and its own right to forest, which is reasserted 
through the use of fire clearance of areas opened up by logging roads.  
In other words, the fires were largely the function of human recklessness 
and careless, destructive behaviour on the part of people who were aided, 
supported, and abetted by the GOI. Corporate arson, pursued by the many 
cronies of the regime of President Suharto was predominant. This includes 
both the effects of logging and the clearance of land by fire for oil palm 
plantations. While swidden burning and fires set for land clearance by 
transmigrants cannot be totally ignored, it is minuscule compared to the 
damage done by the corporate cronies and the policies of the GOI.2  
Forests  
Data on Indonesia's forests is incomplete but recent Ministry of Forestry 
estimates indicate that the nation's forests cover 140.4 million hectares. Of 
the total, 30.7 million hectares are protected forests, 18.8 million are nature 
reserves or national parks, 64.3 million hectares are production forests, and 
26.6 million hectares are "convertible forests" designated for non-forest uses 
such as agriculture, settlement, and transmigration. Further study has 
shown that only about 53 million hectares of "frontier forest," relatively 
undisturbed areas of forest large enough to maintain all of their biodiversity, 
remain in Indonesia (Bryant, Neilsen, & Tangley, 1997, p. 21). Resource 
extraction and development pressures have dominated, leading to a 
deforestation rate of more than 1 million hectares per year (recent World 
Bank calculations put it at 1.5 million hectares annually). In 1993 forest 
products accounted for 26.9% of non-oil export earnings or 7% of 
Indonesia's gross domestic product (Government of Indonesia, 1991, p. 9; 
Ministry of Environment, 1997, p. 23).  
For two decades up to 1989 the concessions were allocated without a proper 
forest inventory, with poor management guidelines, and with poor 
monitoring capacity on the part of the government. The logging companies 
were mandated to have a proper inventory every year before they applied 
for annual allowable cut.  But only 2.2% of the targeted forest inventory was 
ever implemented. The log export ban was removed in 1992. However, it 
was replaced by a very high export tax so that, practically speaking, the ban 
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is still imposed. The government also gradually increased public rent 
collection by increasing the reforestation fee from USD 4 per cubic metre in 
1987, to USD 10 in 1989, and to USD 16 in 1993.  
Because the timber plantation program was started very late relative to the 
first logging operations, it will take at least another 5 to 15 years for the 
companies to harvest trees from their own plantations. Furthermore, the 
price of tropical woods will remain high, at least in the short run, providing 
further incentive to cut natural forests regardless of what happens to the 
plantation process.  
Following the Basic Agrarian Law3 of 1960 and the Basic Forestry Law of 
1967, the government divided the territorial rights to forests among timber 
concessionaires, plantations, and transmigration projects at the expense of 
the customary users. The government consequently accelerated a process of 
forestry development that began with President Suharto's New Order 
government in 1966. Forest logging concessions (HPH) were awarded to 
generals who had supported his assumption of power and to other well-
connected entrepreneurs. Until 1967, timbering for exports had been 
minimal (Hill, 1994, p. 76).  Foreign Investment law No. 1/1967, one of the 
first acts-and arguably the most significant-of the Suharto regime, 
irreversibly changed the balance between the relative volumes and values of 
timber and non-timber forest products (Peluso, 1992, p. 59). Clause five of 
the Forestry Act of 1967 states: "The commercial leasing of forests is based 
on maintaining and expanding the production of timber, as a part of the 
national development and goals of the people." The Act was designed simply 
to entice foreign investment as a means of raising large amounts of capital 
to overcome the enormous debts being incurred to fund national 
development schemes (Robison, 1990, p. 12; Smith, 1992, p. 18). It 
brought a flood of American and Japanese investment, fuelling what was 
described as a "forest development Olympics" in Indonesian Borneo (WALHI, 
1992, p. 17). By the mid-1970s foreign actors had mechanised Indonesian 
logging, speeding both production and environmental degradation as they 
mined wood to be shipped back to their countries for processing.  
As well, from the beginning to the present, inadequate intellectual and 
policing resources were allocated to the task of regulating the forest 
industry. It is in the area of log control and management where most 
opportunity for malfeasance arose. The officers most directly responsible for 
checking log measurement and revenue calculation are relatively junior, 
poorly paid (with inadequate travel and other allowances), and (often) ill-
equipped in terms of training and means of transportation to perform their 
function. There is nothing unusual about this as most forestry institutions in 
tropical states are chronically short of skilled labour, training, information, 
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funding, and administrative authority (Sharma, 1992).  
In the late 1960s manual logging became so lucrative that people not only 
shifted their part-time collection activities from non-tropical forest products 
but also often deserted their entire repertoires of subsistence and economic 
activities to join in the timber cutting and trade stimulated by the boom. 
Urban businessmen diversified their portfolios by investing in land and forest 
capital thereby earning huge profits in the infant logging industry (FAO, 
1989, p. 5). Then in late 1971 the government implemented a blanket 
restriction on manual logging that was strictly enforced largely due to the 
refusal by Japanese buyers to purchase hand-cut logs. Thousands of manual 
woodcutters lost a critical and prolific source of cash, sending them back to 
agricultural and other collection activities.  
The duration of logging concessions dispensed to private interests was only 
20 years.  This was far too short to encourage any attitude other than short-
term exploitation given that any reasonable regeneration and re-harvest 
cycle is 35 years. Replanting was rarely carried out and never policed. 
Logging companies had to deposit a reforestation fee, which was refundable, 
according to timber harvested; but because the costs of reforestation were 
higher than the reforestation fee, it was cheaper for logging companies to 
pay the fee and forego the refund. Where cleared land is abandoned alang-
alang grass (Imperata cyclindrica) becomes established very rapidly and 
renders the land virtually useless for any purpose. There are an estimated 
16 to 20 million hectares of this grass in Kalimantan and Sumatra, and the 
area is increasing at a rate of 100,000 to 150,000 hectares per year (Hill, 
1994, p. 201). 
Irony and Optimism  
Environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) in Indonesia have 
played an unprecedented role in influencing public opinion and policy since 
the 1970s (Warren & Elston, 1993, p. 12). The Indonesian Forum For the 
Environment (WALHI), the Green Indonesia Foundation (YIH), and the 
Indonesian Society for Forest Protection (SKEPHI) have for many years been 
leaders in this effort and have developed a strong and dedicated following, 
particularly among university students (World Bank, 1990, p. 23). They 
have suffered much at the hands of the police and military for their efforts. 
Up until the present they have been unable to overcome the authoritarian 
power of the Suharto regime and the related cronies of the Suharto family 
dynasty.  
The catastrophic fires have generated a momentum for reform from both 
Indonesian national as well as international ENGOs. The fires of the late 
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1990s marked the first time that the government was forced to officially 
acknowledge the link between the fires, with their disastrous effects, and the 
actions of private firms in the forestry and plantation sector. This link was 
then widely reported and condemned within the country. The breakdown of 
the cognitive dissonance represented by Indonesian Ministry of Forestry 
officials led to this forced admission, which would not have been possible 
without the sophisticated satellite mapping that took place via support from 
the World Bank (Barber & Schweithelm, 2000, pp. 38-40). International 
media crews, drawing on satellite imagery along with other sources of 
information provided by the ENGOs, were able to argue that the damage 
was emanating from deliberate commercial clearing activities, for oil palm in 
particular. It was clear that the fires were not wildfires resulting from the 
"careless behaviour of ignorant small farmers," but rather, deliberate land-
clearing activities, often under government-sponsored or protected schemes 
operated by those who had regularly ignored prohibitions and pleas not to 
use fire (Byron & Shepherd, 1998). Satellite technology has shown up the 
prevarication and deceit of the government and corporate arsonists who are 
no longer able to lay the blame, as they have in the past, on the swidden 
agriculturalists. This is a major step forward in making the problem 
transparent. A major environmental disaster has provided the momentum to 
move in a progressive direction to prevent it from happening again.  
Yet another irony is that it appears, for how long no one can be sure, that 
the World Bank has taken up the ENGO cause in a dedicated fashion via the 
bête noire of most environmentalists, a "structural adjustment program" 
(SAP).4 The World Bank has been criticised by most international ENGOs for 
being a force for regressive change, and the SAPs have become noted for 
generating political upheaval, regressive environmental results, and 
increasing poverty amongst the sub-dominant groups in the less-developed 
world (Rich, 1994). However in this specific instance, it may just be possible 
that the World Bank will be an effective proponent of forest policy reform 
using the power of the purse.  
The resident World Bank forestry specialist Jim Douglas, who had been in 
Jakarta from 1992 to 1994 predicted that a continuation of nonsustainable 
forest management practices would drive the sector's contributions to output 
growth and export revenue into decline early in the new millennium. He 
recommended, in a confidential report, an extensive program of policy 
reforms, including a shift from log export taxes to increased royalties, an 
end to the plywood marketing board monopoly (APKINDO), longer and 
transferable concessions, concession performance bonds, and a third-party 
monitoring and enforcement mechanism. His review also recommended 
policy changes "to facilitate the titling of forest dwelling and adjacent 
communities in forest land, and also to facilitate the award of concession or 
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stewardship contracts over forest areas, to such groups."  He also politely 
suggested, "resistance from vested interests can be expected to be strong" 
(World Bank 1995c, pp. i-ii; World Bank 1995d, p. 21). Douglas was 
transferred shortly after these reports were prepared, the recommendations 
were not followed through, and the World Bank, as an organisation, 
remained absent and invisible with respect to forestry policy until after the 
1997 crisis. Vested interests had, indeed, proven more influential than the 
resident officer for forestry in the World Bank.  
However, opportunistic or not, the World Bank dusted off the reform project 
of the ex-resident officer in 1997 and confronted the GOI with "structural 
adjustment assistance subject to comprehensive reforms throughout the 
forestry sector."  In return for the Bank's pledge of USD 4.5 billion financial 
assistance package, immediate and consequential forestry reforms were 
required. Whatever the reasoning, the symbolic significance of the forest 
sector was seen as the perfect example of poor economic governance and 
cronyism and used to push the regime forward (Seymour, 2000, p. 91; 
Schwartz & Paris, 1999). Given the depth of the economic crisis and the 
increasingly disruptive political crisis, the Indonesian State, a paragon of 
nationalism, had little room to manoeuvre. The GOI agreed to a series of 
deadlines and promised a sweeping program of reform in the sector. 
Although the deadlines, early on, were met more in the breach than 
otherwise, and the Indonesian Wood Panel Association (APKINDO) remained 
as powerful as ever through early 1998, the World Bank held to its 
requirements and suspended release of the second tranche of the assistance 
program.  
Today, the situation has become more complicated. Implementation of the 
reforms stalled during 1999, largely due to the bureaucratic recalcitrance of 
the Ministry of Forestry and Estate Crops (Seymour, 2000, p. 98). But more 
has been achieved over the past three years than had been the case over 
the previous decade. The GOI has replaced export taxes on forest products 
with resource royalties and has completely reformed concession 
management procedures. APKINDO has been abolished as one of the most 
powerful cartels in Indonesia. A major crony of the Suharto family, chairman 
of APKINDO and APHI (Indonesian Loggers' Association), was Mohammed 
'Bob' Hasan. He personally controlled 2 million hectares of forest 
concessions (International Organization for Ecological Justice in Indonesia, 
1991, p. 3; Runyan, 1998) but he has most recently been humiliated by 
criminal charges and has completely fallen out of favour with the present 
regime, to the extent that he may end up serving a lengthy term in prison. 
The World Bank has gotten back on track; monitoring the progress of reform 
and structural adjustment assistance is no longer the prerogative of the 
economic rationalists in the Bank. Decentralisation and "community forestry" 
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are back on the agenda for both the GOI and the World Bank. Fees collected 
by the GOI from concessionaires per cubic metre of timber extracted have 
tripled. ENGOs are able to operate with less fear of reprisal. 
   
Conclusion  
The forestry sector of Indonesia is now situated at a major point of 
transition. Ahead lies a situation where limits to easily accessible natural 
resources, once foreseen, are now an evident reality. There is still continuing 
evidence of concession damage, overexploitation, illegal logging, 
underreporting of cut, failure to reforest, and dissatisfaction among forest 
communities. The general policy and incentive mix of the Indonesian 
Government, and its field implementation, has not yet avoided the 
prevalence of wasteful techniques and gross inefficiencies in exploiting a 
once plentiful, still undervalued, and increasingly scarce matrix of tropical 
forest resources.  
However, as has been suggested herein, a combination of destructive fires in 
the rainforest and the financial collapse may have signalled both the nadir of 
a terrible waste of ecological resources and the opportunity to begin the 
process of tropical rainforest recovery and maintenance in a region most 
important for all of humanity. The most blatant criminal degradation of the 
Indonesian rainforests by individuals such as 'Bob' Hasan has been brought 
to an end. World attention has been focused on the problem of the 
devastating fires and the blame for the fires, for the first time without 
equivocation, has been placed on the corporate arsonists. The World Bank 
has moved in the direction of understanding the economic and ecological 
importance of the natural environment and the financial crisis has provided 
the World Bank with the power to use aid and assistance as a "carrot and 
stick" in return for progress on forestry policy by the government.   
Since late 1997 a number of Indonesian ENGOs have been working together 
to develop an organization called Forest Watch Indonesia (FWI), an 
independent, decentralised early-warning monitoring network for tracking 
logging, plantation development, mining, and other large-scale development 
activities within and around Indonesia's major remaining blocks of natural 
forest. They are in the process of creating a sophisticated series of 
databases including:  
         baseline data on the status of Indonesia's forests (type, coverage, 
condition, infrastructure such as roads, utilisation, human settlements, 
population, and traditional claim areas),  
         existing and planned development projects (logging concessions, 
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industrial timber plantation concessions, estate crop plantations, mining 
concessions, infra-structure projects, and transmigration project areas),  
         conflicts over forestlands and resources (types of conflicts, parties 
involved, description, location, time period, etc.),  
         data and analysis covering the economic, political, and legal aspects of 
forest policy and related conflicts, and  
         documentation of forestry management success stories, including both 
well-managed logging concessions and local community forest 
management systems. (Barber & Schweithelm, 2000, p. 46)  
The fall of Suharto in mid-1998 and the advent of the reformasi movement 
have opened a window of opportunity. This is the ground for optimism. 
Whether or not the window will stay open, and if it does, whether or not the 
people of Indonesia will take advantage of an historic opportunity, remains 
to be seen.  
The World Bank has initiated a series of steps for reformation of the forestry 
sector that will assist the local ENGOs in particular, but also will provide 
increased transparency for other international organisations. One of the 
tragedies of the crisis was its effect on the poor and vulnerable so the Bank 
has had to walk a fault line in tying assistance to reform, since the lack of 
assistance will impact the poor of Indonesia as well as the capitalist cronies.  
The irony of a conjuncture of political, economic, and environmental crises in 
Indonesia unleashes an opportunity to rectify the devastation of the tropical 
rainforests and promote real sustainable use for the poor and vulnerable. 
There is now something on which to build for the civil society in Indonesia 
and a positive lesson for both the World Bank and other international 
organisations to promote economic equity and environmental sustainability. 
While seeking a partnership between ENGOs and the World Bank in 
Indonesia is Panglossian in the extreme, optimism exists for the possibility 
of change.  
Notes  
1. The collapse of the GDP figures was both a function of a collapse of the 
productive economy, but also was due to the significant depreciation of the 
rupiah against the USD.  
2.  Shifting cultivation is practiced by approximately 6 million people over 9 
to 11 million hectares, or 9% of the forest area. Kalimantan and Sumatra 
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account for three-fourths, and Irian Jaya for about 11% (FAO, 1990a, p. 
12).  
3.  The Basic Agrarian Law, enacted in 1960, was a comprehensive legal 
effort to modernise Indonesian landownership. The law recognised previous 
ownership rights under both adat and Western systems, but provided a new 
certification process under which land was to be surveyed, mapped, and 
registered. All unclaimed land reverted to government ownership. Land 
certification, however, was not compulsory and registration was still far from 
complete by the end of the 1980s. The law also set limits on the size of 
landownership depending on the population density of the region and the 
type of land. In areas with over 401 people per square kilometre, rice fields 
were limited to a maximum of five hectares and a minimum of two hectares. 
Absentee ownership was forbidden.  
4.  SAPs promote economy-wide policy change and institutional reform, 
rather than to promote specific projects. The objectives of SAPs are to: 
provide balance of payments support, promote economic growth and poverty 
alleviation by stabilising the macroeconomic environment, increase efficiency 
in the use of resources, and improve the scope for private sector 
development (World Bank, 1992). Normally, this is accomplished by 
insisting, among other things, that the government in question cut subsidies 
to the poor, increase privatisation and corporatisation, and free up 
international trade.  
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